Envisioning Africa's future: a story of changing perceptions by Gatune Kariuki, Julius
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future Issues in Brief Series
2010-03
Envisioning Africa's future: a story
of changing perceptions
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/22721
Boston University
Envisioning Africa’s Future: A  
Story of Changing Perceptions
m a r c h  2 0 1 0
013
Issues In BrIef
Julius Gatune Kariuki
Nations’ futures are shaped by how they are perceived by their citizens, policy makers, and 
external forces. The present state of sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is a product of actions by 
external and, more recently, internal actors that have been driven by how Africa has been seen 
in the past. Thus, current perceptions of Africa will help shape its future.
Over the past half century, external actors for Africa have included missionaries, adventurers, 
entrepreneurs, empire builders and, more recently, donors. In designing the various schemes 
that have shaped the present perceptions of Africa, in particular the “dark continent” image 
has played a central role. 
Likewise Africans’ perceptions of themselves have been critical in shaping Africa, more so 
in the post-colonial era. The “victim” perception particularly has played a critical role in 
determining the image and the relationships that Africa has developed with the outside world. 
Indeed, how people see themselves determines what standards they hold themselves to.
Perceptions about Africa will continue to influence how its future is viewed and thus shaped. 
The year 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of “The Year of Africa,” and as we anticipate how 
Africa will develop over the next 50 years, it is important to understand how perceptions of 
the continent have evolved in the past. This paper explores how the changing image of Africa 
has influenced the thinking about its future prospects since the 1960s, and how current 
perceptions may influence its future development.
Pre-Independence: from Land of the Gods to the heart of Darkness
In antiquity there was a great fascination with this largely unexplored land South of Egypt. For 
the Pharaohs of Egypt, it was the land of their forefathers, where they looked when in need of 
renewal. The Greeks had great reverence for the “Blameless” Africans where their gods went 
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to feast with the older Gods of Ethiopia. For the Romans, it was the land of great mystery 
which led Pliny-the-elder, the famous Roman geographer and writer to quip that “...Something 
new always comes from Africa....”
In the Middle Ages, Africa was the land of gold and knowledge. Italian Arab geographer Leo 
Africanus gave vivid accounts of a rich intellectual and commercial life in Timbuktu. Africa 
was also the land of Prestor John, the conquering Christian King of Ethiopia, who was going 
to save Europe from the Islamic juggernaut. 
The rise of Europe following the discovery of the new world and the industrial revolution 
changed perceptions of Africa, and the images formed during this period continue to influence 
how Africa is perceived today. The discovery of the new world created huge demand for slave 
labor. The industrial revolution created demand for both raw materials and for markets for 
surplus products. The need to enslave people and colonize lands clashed with the humanity 
of Europeans; to reconcile the two, Africa had to be reconstructed to fit an image that would 
allow for the execution of these schemes. This required robbing any dignity or morality of 
people to be enslaved or colonized, making them inherently inferior. The epitome of this view 
was the German philosopher Hegel’s teaching of 1830 that “...Africa is no Historical Part of 
the World, having no movement or development to exhibit.” (Davidson 1994, 80). The “Heart 
of Darkness” myth was thus born. Africa became a backward place that needed to be tamed 
and developed, giving justification for the 3Cs project (Civilization, Christianization and 
Commerce). In Rudyard Kipling’s words, Africa became the “White Man’s Burden”.
The 1960s: The Winds of change
The Second World War had the effect of shaking the image of the Europeans. The survival of 
the big colonial powers came to depend on African soldiers. The myth of the colonial powers’ 
invincibility was thus shattered in many Africans’ eyes. Europe’s exhaustion from the two 
world wars combined with the awakened Africans led to a change in perception that colonial 
rule could be sustained. This change of mood was best captured by the famous “Winds of 
Change” speech by the British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, in 1960 that signaled the 
end of colonialism.
The granting of independence changed perceptions of Africa. A new sense of understanding 
was called for. Now the missionary and the witch doctor were urged to find a meeting ground 
(Carter 1962). The colonial administrators were replaced by the development experts. Africa 
thus graduated from barbarism to become the poster child of development. A report to the 
American Academy of Sciences of the science mission to Africa captures the changing image: 
“My predominant reaction on this 
trip was surprise — surprise that 
Africa had come so far as it has 
in science, self-government and in 
eagerness to move ahead.”  
(Seaborg 1970, 169) 
Indeed the economies of Africa 
grew at a good pace averaging 
GDP per capita growth of 
about 2.3 percent (Fosu 2009). 
Africa was doing well in moving 
people out of poverty.
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future forecast  In 1967, Kahn and Wiener forecasted the long-term prospects of 
Africa using year 2000 as the horizon (see Shaw 1982). As shown in Figure 1 (page 4),  
the forecast projected Africa almost doubling its income by year 2000 and maintaining  
its share global GDP. 
While Africa’s GDP rose substantially between 1965 and 2000 compared to the 
forecasted growth (700 percent vs 370 percent), the growth in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP) was only about 200 percent. The per capita income in PPP terms actually fell 
by about 5 percent, primarily because of the unforeseen economic shocks of the 1970s 
that resulted in very high global inflation and also worsening terms of trade for Africa. 
The 1970s: from Winds of change to Whirlwinds of change
The very image of Africa’s backwardness as original, almost primeval, resulted in post-colonial 
Africa simply reinforcing bad ex-colonial structures rather than setting up new structures 
that were attuned to the history and reality of the continent. For instance, Mazrui (2002) 
points that the constitutions bequeathed to Africa were replicas of British and French models, 
as if pre-colonial Africa had no governance structures and traditions to draw from. The 
results were constitutions that were alien to the people. On top of these weak foundations, 
independence was granted to highly unprepared countries. Congo, a country the size of 
Western Europe, awoke to self-rule with 30 university graduates, no doctors, no lawyers, no 
secondary school teachers, no army officers, and a civil service with only three Congolese 
out of 1400 posts (Meredith 2005, 101). Africa had thus started off with extremely weak 
and unstable state structures. These weak structures engendered highly corrupt patrimonial 
systems as unstable elites sought to entrench themselves. They quickly failed to deliver the 
independence promise of modernization.
The failure to deliver the promise of independence prompted the military to offer an 
alternative (Ajayi 1998). This new whirlwind brought the first coup in 1966 and by 1973 
more than half of Africa was under military rule. Military rule was now seen as the long-
term pattern of evolution of the African state since the military was the only institution 
with a national outlook. The military proved to be poor rulers, transforming Africa to the 
“bloody continent”. However, 
in the prevailing cold war 
discourse, regimes had no 
problems finding a legitimating 
framework. To the cold war 
adversaries, Africa was the new 
battleground for influence.
The situation was exacerbated 
by the 1973 and the 1979 oil 
shocks that ushered in global 
recessions. Africa fared poorly 
in this turbulent period. As a 
result, the high per capita income growth of 2.2 percent experienced in the 1960s had plunged 
to zero percent by the end of 1970s (Fosu 2009). Africa was on its way to negative growth in 
incomes, with the World Bank forecasting a worst case scenario of –1.0 percent growth for the 
1980s decade (Helleiner 1983).
In trying to explain the deterioration of Africa’s prospects, two schools of thought emerged. 
The dependence/neo-colonialism school argued that Africa was a victim of a world system 
that had been structured to exploit it. The dependency school called for disengagement with 
the West. To this end, in 1980 Africa adopted the Lagos Plan of Action that called for the 
move toward self-sufficiency, where African countries would focus on working and trading 
with each other. 
The self-inflicted injury school saw Africa as being responsible for the situation. It pointed to 
poor leadership and misguided policies that had exacerbated the poor initial conditions. As a 
result, this school argued, Africa had been losing competitiveness over the years. The solution 
to the problem was seen as structural adjustment of the economy from state centric models 
to market driven models.
3
The FredericK S. Pardee cenTer For 
The STudy oF The LonGer-ranGe FuTure
www.bu.edu/pardee
future forecast  Figure 2 (page 5) summarizes the forecasts done for Africa by 
Hughes and Strauch in 1978 (see Shaw 1982). This forecast turned out to be fairly close 
to actual outcomes when using market exchange rates data. However the inflationary 
period of the 1970s had greatly eroded Africa’s purchasing power so that when using  
PPP these modest forecasts turned out to be quite optimistic. The incomes per capita  
in PPP terms actually declined by about 16 percent (on PPP power basis) and Africa’s 
share of global GDP declined by about 50 percent.
The 1980s: africa is in crisis
In the 1980s, Africa plunged into its biggest economic crisis since independence. GDP per 
capita declined to negative territory; it averaged –1.76 percent between 1981 and 1985 and 
stayed in negative territory until 1995 (Fosu 2009). A major famine also hit at the beginning of 
1980s, sending images of hopelessness and death across the world. Africa seemed to be in its 
death throes and this called for radical interventions. 
The self-sufficiency option proposed in the Lagos Plan of Action failed to gain any traction 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) stepped in to the rescue. Africa was put through 
a painful structural adjustment program (SAP). This entailed deep cuts in government, 
public investments and the introduction of cost-sharing in government services. SAPs were 
highly unpopular with the public and the politicians. But the fact that they were implemented 
underscored the depth of the crisis Africa was in. The prevailing view was that incompetence 
and a free hand had driven Africa into a hole that only outsiders could extricate it from. Africa 
had also lost much respect so that in developing SAPs, the BWIs were accused of displaying 
arrogance and paternalism (Helleiner 1983). 
The 1990s:  
africa is Dying
The 1990s saw Africa hit 
the nadir. The abortive start 
of forced democratization 
introduced new instability as 
entrenched incumbents put 
up a spirited resistance. The 
application of SAPs proved 
quite inadequate in saving Africa 
economies. The weakened state 
provided a welcome opportunity 
for a new type of insurgent, the 
conflict entrepreneurs; with 
no powerful armies to face 
and interested only in looting, 
these groups could accomplish 
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figure 1: Kahn & Wiener africa forecasts for 1965-2000
Kahn & Wiener
Actual
Actual (2000 $ PPP)
Source: Shaw (1982) for Kahn & Wiener forecasts (1967) and The World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online (WDI Online) for 
actual outcomes.
future forecast  Africa in the 1990s was seen as spiraling to anarchy. This future 
was best captured by Robert Kaplan (1994) where “...failed government leading an unruly 
army, a corrupt and ineffectual bureaucracy, unchecked spread of disease, deforestation, 
and environmental destruction... urban shantytowns, declining economies... hopeless 
despair and illiterate teenage gangs inflicting unbridled violence in societies marked by 
incessant tribal rivalry.…”
Moynihan (1993 cited in Pham 2005) predicted that this was the start of the break-up of 
Africa to tribal enclaves with over 150 states. While Eritrea broke off from Ethiopia and 
Somalia disintegrated to two yet unrecognized regions (Puntland and Somaliland), the 
generalized disintegration never gathered pace. Indeed the break-up that happened was a 
reversion to colonial boundaries (Eritrea under Italian rule and Somaliland under British 
rule) implying that the artificial boundaries of Africa may be more enduring than thought.
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their mission by holding a small territory for looting and training children as soldiers. Sender 
(1999) points that references to Africa assumed stomach churning medical/biological terms 
like “blood,” “rot,” “scars,” “mutilation” and “plagues.” The New Republic had a special issue, 
“Africa is Dying” (June 16, 1997).
Attempts to explain the unraveling of Africa cited the nature of Africans themselves. 
Explanations included “…the jealousy of an African underachieving culture...” “…perverse 
‘tribal’ culture and political debauchery of Africans...” (Chege 1998, 212). Easterly and Levine 
(1997) pointed to ethnicity as the key culprit, arguing that ethnic competition had prevented 
development of good policies.
The new millennium: The Dawn of an african renaissance?
The ascent of Nelson Mandela in South Africa and the great leadership he displayed put to 
rest the idea that Africa was on a path to anarchy. Further, in the new millennium the vicious 
developments of the 1990s had been contained and the situation was seen as improving. 
Liberia and Sierra Leone had managed to remove the criminals who had captured the state 
with an African country, 
Nigeria, playing a central role in 
restoring stability. In Rwanda, 
the genocidal regime had 
capitulated to new leadership 
that was foresighted and 
disciplined. There was talk of 
new leadership emerging in 
Africa. The tide seemed to have 
changed. Thambo Mbeki used 
the term “Africa Renaissance” 
to capture the change. This was 
despite the continuing instability 
and conflict in Congo.
The external perception 
of Africa also turned. The 
continent was now seen as 
www.bu.edu/pardee
figure 2: WIm africa forecasts for 1975-2000 
Source: Shaw (1982) for World Integrated Model (WIM) forecasts (Hughes & Strauch 1978) and The World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators Online (WDI Online) for actual outcomes. 
WIM
Actual
Actual (2000 $ PPP)
future forecast  At the dawn of the millennium, a number of countries had 
recorded growth rates of more than five percent per year. The terms of trade for the 
high performers were not better than for low performers, indicating that internal 
factors were at play in explaining the differences in performance.  The Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) was of the opinion that this spurt 
of growth pointed to the first time since independence the possibility of an economic 
takeoff in Africa. To this end, it commissioned a study to understand and project the 
positive trends being observed. Figure 3 (page 6) shows the projection for 14 identified 
reformers under the maximum growth scenario. 
The identified countries have generally performed better than forecasted, re-affirming 
the authors’ hunch. The exceptions were Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, which 
subsequently went through political turmoil.
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a victim in need of a helping hand, with the unfortunate fate of being trapped in poverty 
by a combination of factors not of its making, especially bad geography (tropical diseases, 
poor soils etc.) and a colonial legacy. The call for massive aid programs to get Africa out of 
its development trap, led by Jeffrey Sachs, gained momentum. A new type of philanthropic 
efforts, epitomized by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, took on Africa’s challenge. Media 
stars led by Bono also enthusiastically took up the new “White Man’s Burden” as concern for 
Africa suddenly became cool (Magubane 2007). 
While the effort undertaken by donors, foundations and celebrities were lauded, some saw a 
sinister side to this development. Mugabane (2007) argues that this was reviving the colonial-
era message that the future of Africa is for Europeans (the West) to shape. Pineau (2005) also 
makes the point that by highlighting the plight of Africa to mobilize donations, aid agencies 
became guilty of reinforcing the image of Africa as a place of death and desperation.
2010 and Beyond: The Last Business frontier 
With growing population and rising incomes, Africa is starting to look like the last frontier of 
business. It has been observed that the market for baby diapers in Nigeria is now potentially 
larger than the whole of Western Europe while the U.S. government Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) notes that Africa offers the highest returns on investment 
(Pineau 2005). A new scramble for Africa’s business landscape is now evident with both 
global and local players joining the fray. 
Asia, led by China, is leading the renewed interest in business opportunities in Africa. 
China construction industries, telecommunication firms and agro-business firms are 
investing heavily. The Middle East is also investing heavily especially in banking and 
telecommunication. From the West, the traditional multinationals are being joined by private 
equity firms that are investing in an array of activities including power generation, finance, 
and telecommunications. These new players are also showing great interest in investing in 
agriculture as countries start to worry about the security of future food supply. Even the 
world of sports recognizes Africa’s potential for market expansion and its ability to host major 
international events as the FIFA World Cup holds its 2010 tournament in South Africa.
www.bu.edu/pardee
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The big business opportunity has not been lost on African firms that are now venturing 
aggressively beyond their borders. Nigerian firms are moving into West and Central Africa 
markets, Kenyan firms are branching to Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa firms are invading 
the whole of Africa. North African countries led by Libya are re-orienting themselves to face 
south. We are witnessing the birth of African multinationals.
conclusion
The perception of Africa’s future is heavily influenced by current events rather than a detailed 
understanding of the underlying drivers. Thus when Africa’s economy does well the future 
becomes rosy; when an economic crisis hits Africa, analysts are quick to declare it dead (Figure 
4). Sender (1999) makes a powerful argument against this type of analysis. He demonstrates 
that Africa had made spectacular progress especially in education and agriculture between 1960 
and 1994 yet the commentary at the time showed Africa descending to anarchy.
Collier (2006) observes that Africa seems to be a game of snakes and ladders and the snakes 
seem to be more prominent. This point has been 
analytically well-documented by Bethelemy and 
Soderling (2001), who after analyzing growth 
rates of African countries over 40 years found a 
preponderance of reversal in growth spurts. They 
observed that countries migrate in and out of the 
top and bottom ten with a few cases of persistent 
high growers and low growers. Indeed Bratton 
(1997, 68) makes the point that rather than 
seeking simple cross sectional generalizations, 
analysts must recognize that African countries are 
on forking, circuitous and contested paths. 
Predicting the future of Africa will continue to be 
a hazardous affair. However, under the chaotic 
surface that seems to inform perceptions, real 
progress is being made. Like the game of snakes 
and ladders, progress is made despite the snakes, 
so long as one keeps on playing. A review of the 
past 50 years shows that Africa has been playing 
and will continue to play maybe even better now 
that the bigger snakes may have been passed. •
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